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EMINENT DOMAIN - COMPENSATION - A PUBLIC CONDEMNEE IS ENTITLED ONLY TO THE MARKET VALUE OF A
CONDEMNED FACILITY WHEN THE MARKET VALUE OF
THE CONDEMNED FACILITY IS ASCERTAINABLE. United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
In United States v. 50 Acres of Land (Duncanville), I the federal government condemned a 50 acre tract of land used by the City of Duncanville, Texas as a sanitary landfill. 2 In order to fulfill its statutory
obligation to provide for the disposal of its garbage, 3 the city purchased a
113.7 acre site and developed it into a new landfill. 4 At trial, the city
sought to recover the cost of developing the new site, an amount in excess of $1,276,000.00, as the proper measure of compensation for the
condemned facility.s The government, however, contended that the
proper measure of compensation should be determined by the condemned facility's fair market value. 6 In response to special interrogatories, the jury returned a verdict of $225,000.00 representing the fair
market value of the condemned facility, and an alternative verdict of
1. 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
2. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 529 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 706
F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). The site was needed by the
federal government to accommodate the United States Army Corps of Engineers
Lakeview Lake Flood Control Project (subsequently renamed the Joe Pool Flood
Control Project). United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1358 (5th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). The federal government commenced this action
by filing a complaint in condemnation, coupled with a declaration of taking, pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.c. § 258a (1931). United States v. 50
Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 453 n.3 (1984). Under that procedure, the federal
government deposits the estimated value of the property in the registry of the court,
whereupon title and right to possession vest immediately in the government. In
subsequent judicial proceedings, the value of the property is determined and the
condemnee is awarded the difference between the adjudicated value and the sum
already received, plus interest on that difference. See id. (quoting Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2191 (1984)). Property owned by state and
local governments is subject to the federal power of eminent domain. See Block v.
North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 291 n.26 (1983); Oklahoma ex rei. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). In relation to the federal government as
condemnor, such property is considered to be "private property" for which just
compensation must be paid under the fifth amendment. See Jefferson County v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871
(1945); United States v. Wheeler TP., 66 F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1933); United
States v. Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520, 521, 523 (1st Cir. 1907).
3. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 (Vernon 1982) (regulating solid waste
disposal and sanitary landfills in Texas).
4. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451,453 (1984). The old site had been
used as a landfill from 1969 to 1978 and had an expected remaining life of 12.8
years. The new site had an expected life of 41.6 years due to its larger size, superior
soil, and superior water table conditions. Id. at 453 n.4.
5. Id. at 453.
6. Id. Experts for both the government and the city agreed that a market for landfill
properties existed in the area. Based on an evaluation of the recent sale prices of
comparable properties, the experts for the city estimated the value of the condemned facility as between $367,500 and $370,000; experts for the government estimated its value as between $160,410 and $190,000. Id. at 453-54 n.5 (1984).
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$723,654.01 representing the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent
substitute facility.1 The district court entered judgment for the lower
amount. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent substitute facility is the proper measure of compensation in the case of a
public condemnee with a duty to replace the condemned facility.9 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that a public condemnee is not entitled
to compensation measured by the cost of acquiring a substitute facility
when the market value of the condemned facility is ascertainable. 1O
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 11 The fundamental principle underlying the just compensation
clause is one of indemnity: an owner of condemned property is entitled
to be placed in as good a pecuniary position as if the property had not
been taken. 12 Because value is an inexact, highly subjective concept, 13
the Supreme Court has adopted the relatively objective concept of market value at the time of taking l4 as a just and equitable guideline for
7. Id. at 454.
8. Id. In eminent domain proceedings, the trial court decides all issues, factual and
legal, except the amount of compensation to be awarded. See United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1970); FED. R. CIv. P. 71A(h).
9. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1360 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 451 (1984). The court of appeals held that Duncanville was entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable cost of an alternative landfill site, the reasonable cost
of preparing that site for use as a landfill, plus reimbursement for use of a temporary
site in excess of the costs the city would have incurred at the original site. Id. at
1363-64. The court of appeals, however, remanded the case for a new trial because
the jury instructions were "inadequate to enable the jury to make a fair and complete determination of the costs, including consideration of benefits received, of this
[new landfill]." Id. at 1363; see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
10. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 453 (1984).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979) (quoting Olson
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934».
13. According to the Supreme Court:
The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value
to the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker. Most
things, however, have a general demand which give them a value transferable from one owner to another . . . . [The] loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic
attachment to it. . . is properly treated as part of the burden of common
citizenship.
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1948).
14. The general rule is that just compensation is determined as of the date of taking.
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,22-23 (1958); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 374 (1943). Accordingly, fluctuations in property values after that date,
whether attributable to activities of the government or otherwise, are irrelevant. See
United States v. 161.99 Acres of Land, 512 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1975). Changes in
value before the date of taking caused by anticipation that there will be a taking also
are not compensable. See United States v. 3.66 Acres of Land, 426 F. Supp. 533,
535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Under the "scope of the project" rule, any increase in
value resulting from the government's demand for the property is not compensable.
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measuring just compensation. 15 Market value has been defined as the
price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, with neither party under
a compulsion to buy or sell. 16 According to the Court, the market value
standard strikes the necessary and proper balance between the government's need and the property owner's 10ss.17
In its endeavor to do substantial justice in eminent domain proceedings, the Court has developed objective working rules that refine the concept of market value. 18 For example, the determination of market value
is not limited solely to the condemned property's existing use, but also
takes into consideration the highest and most profitable use for which the
property is adaptable in the reasonably near future. 19 Furthermore, a
condemnee is not entitled to compensation for consequential damages
arising from the condemnation, such as reimbursement for the relocation
costs incurred as a result of the condemnation. 20 Also, the property's

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.
20.

See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1979). See
generally Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 806 (1973) (discussing "scope of project" rule).
See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1979); United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1950); United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396,402 (1949). There are
essentially three methods of market valuation: sales approach; income approach;
and cost approach. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d
Cir. 1968); Wilmington Hous. Auth. v. Greater S1. John Baptist Church, 291 A.2d
282, 284 (Del. 1972). The sales approach assesses value by a comparison of sales of
property with similar characteristics, and it is considered to be the most objective
method of valuation. See United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1400
(10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765, 775 (4th Cir. 1964).
The income approach generally is applied in valuating income producing properties.
See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3][c] (rev.
3d ed. 1985). The income approach capitalizes the anticipated net income from a
property and converts this figure into an indication of market value. Id. Some
courts allow use of the income approach as a factor in the determination of market
value by the sales approach; other courts only allow its admission in cases in which
comparable sales are not available. Compare In re James Madison Houses, 17
A.D.2d 317, 320-21, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (1962), with United States v. 49,375
Square Feet of Land, 92 F. Supp. 384, 393 (S.D.N. Y. 1950). See also infra notes 2731 and accompanying text (discussing cost approach).
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,474
(1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961);
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
See United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396,
402 (1940); see also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1896) Gust compensation
not to be measured from the jaundiced perspective of either the public or the
owner).
See United States v. Cors., 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949); United States v. 320.0 Acres of
Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (1979). Congress has authorized greater relief in certain
areas to indemnify the property owner beyond the constitutional minimum. See
Uniform Relocation and Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1982). See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED. 9
(1977) (analyzing cases which construe and apply the act).
See Searles, Highest and Best Use: The Keystone of Valuation in Eminent Domain,
45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 39 (1973). The future use must be one that is reasonable. See
Mills v. United States, 363 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1966).
See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (per curiam); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. 'Co., 339 U.S. 261, 264 (1950).
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subjective value to its owner arising from its adaptability to a particular
use may not be considered in the determination of just compensation. 21
That the market value standard fails to compensate for all the values
an owner may derive from his property is justified by the need to have
"relatively objective valuation standards" and a "workable measure of
valuation."22 The rationale for this failure to indemnify the condemnee
completely is that condemnation proceedings are considered to be
against the property and not against the property owner;23 therefore,
compensation is "for the property and not to the owner. "24
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that in certain circumstances the application of the market value standard may deviate too
significantly from the indemnity principle to fulfill adequately the intent
of just compensation. 25 Departure from the market value standard is
necessary when the market value of condemned property is unascertainable, or when the application of the market value standard would result in
"manifest injustice" to the condemnee. 26
Departure from the market value standard is appropriate where the
condemnation involves special purpose property - property of value to
its owner because of its peculiar characteristics or uses.27 Property of
this unique nature is difficult to valuate by the market value standard
because it is rarely bought or sold on the open market; therefore, the
courts have turned to alternate methods of valuation to determine a condemnee's loss when such property is condemned. 28
The courts have applied different methods of special purpose property valuation, depending upon whether the special purpose property is
21. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1979); Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949).
22. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979).
23. See A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924); United States
v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352-53 (1892).
24. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
25. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949).
26. See Kirby Forests Indus. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 n.14 (1984); United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
27. See, e.g., United States v. 84.4 Acres of Land, 348 F.2d 117 (1965) (golf course);
Redevelopment Agency v. First Christian Church, 140 Cal. App. 3d 690, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1983) (church); Trustees at Boston Univ. v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass.
57,190 N.E. 29 (1934) (college property). See generally Level, Evaluation o/Special
Purpose Properties in Condemnation Proceedings, 3 URB. LAW 428 (1971) (discussing special purpose property); Note, Eminent Domain: The Problem 0/ Damages
Where Land Has Been Adapted to a Special Use, 37 B.U. L. REV. 495 (1957) (discussing special purpose property).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965) (market
value abandoned when nature of property produces wide discrepancy between value
to owner and market price); Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Synod, 20 Idaho
568, 572, 119 P. 60, 63-64 (1911) (market value not applicable to special purpose
property); Rochester Urban Renewal v. Patchen Post, 45 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9, 407
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1978) (some other method of valuation necessary for special
purpose property).

404

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

owned privately or pUblicly. When the government condemns privately
owned, special purpose property, the courts generally have applied the
"cost approach" as an approximation of market value, to determine the
just compensation due a private condemnee. 29 The cost approach entails
four major steps: (1) estimating the reproduction costs of improvements;30 (2) estimating the amount of depreciation present in the improvements;3! (3) deducting the total depreciation from the estimated
reproduction costs, thereby arriving at an indication of the improvements' value; and (4) adding the estimated market value of the land to
the value of the improvements, arriving at an approximation of the property's market value. 32 Although the cost approach has been criticized as
inherently inflationary and confusing to apply,33 it is often the only
method available for special purpose property.34
When the government condemns publicly owned special purpose
property, the courts generally have applied the substitute facilities doctrine to determine the just compensation due a state or municipality.35
29. See, e.g., Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Pasternostro, 236 La. 223, 226, 107 So. 2d
451-54 (1958) (no comparable sales data available, therefore cost approach applicable); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md.
132, 262 A.2d 755 (1970) (cost approach required by statute when church condemned); Grace & Hope Mission, Inc. v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 100
R.I. 537, 217 A.2d 476 (1966) (cost approach proper in absence of market value).
30. Reproduction costs and replacement costs are distinct. Reproduction costs refer to
costs of reconstructing the improvements using the same or similar materials; replacement costs are the costs of providing a substitute facility of equal functional
utility. See UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1111 (1974).
31. Estimation of the depreciation of special purpose properties has presented problems.
Both physical and functional depreciation must be included. The functional depreciation of such properties is difficult to estimate accurately because, generally, functional obsolescence is measured by using market data. Thus, the estimation of
depreciation in the case of special purpose properties depends largely upon the appraiser's jUdgment. See J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 12.32[3][b] (rev. 3d ed. 1985).
32. See J. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 101 (1982). Some courts
have allowed the use of the cost approach in the determination of market value as
evidence of the property's highest and best use; other courts exclude consideration
of the cost approach viewing the market approach and the cost approach as totally
independent of one another. Compare In re Oakland Street, N.Y., 13 A.D.2d 668,
669, 213 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (1961) (reproduction cost relevant to determination of
market value) and State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App. 443, 447, 493 P.2d 1252, 1257
(1972) (reproduction cost relevant to determination of market value), with United
States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451, 488-90 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (reproduction cost has little bearing on market value) and Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v.
Pogzeba, 38 Colo. App. 168, 170, 558 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1976) (error to allow evidence of reproduction cost in determining market value). See also UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § IIII (1974) (reproduction cost may be used for purpose of
providing market value).
33. See United States v. Benning Hous. Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960).
34. See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3][b] (rev.
3d. ed. 1985).
35. See, e.g., Caporal v. United States, 577 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1978) (compensation for
taking of streets and alleys is cost of providing necessary substitutes); United States
v. Streets, Alleys, & Public Ways, 531 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1976) (government must
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The substitute facilities doctrine requires that just compensation be measured by the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent substitute facility in order to finance a replacement of the condemned facility by the
public condemnee. 36 The doctrine is not actually a valuation technique,
but a method of compensation that has evolved from court decisions. 37
The doctrine is based upon recognition that the loss to a community occasioned by the condemnation of a public facility is not only the value of
the property itself, but also the loss of the services previously provided by
the condemned facility.38 Thus, a public condemnee cannot be made
supply cost of constructing necessary substitute), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842 (1946);
United States v. Arkansas, 164 F.2d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 1947) (proper measure of
damages for taking of public highways is cost of substitute). The doctrine also is
applicable when a state condemns municipal property. See, e.g., City of Witch ita v.
Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 Kan. 110, 114,439 P.2d 162, 166-67 (1968) (compensation is cost of providing equivalent substitute where property devoted to a
public use by one agency of government is condemned by another agency); City of
Tulsa v. Mingo School Dist. No. 16, 559 P.2d 487, 492-95 (Okla. App. 1976) (substitute facilities doctrine appropriate method of compensation for taking of school
property); State Road Comm'n v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 173 S.E.2d 919, 926-27
(W. Va. 1970) (park commissioners entitled to compensation by payment of cost of
substitute facility). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 143 (1971) (discussing substitute facilities doctrine).
36. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517 (1979) (White, J.,
concurring) ("The substitute-facilities doctrine is unrelated to fair market value. . .
it unabashedly demands additional compensation over and above market value in
order to allow the replacement of the condemned facility."); Town of Clarkville v.
United States, 198 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953);
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § l004(b) (1974). The replacement facility
does not have to be an exact duplicate, only a functional equivalent. See United
States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 764 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Certain
Lands in Red Bluff, 192 F. Supp. 725, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1961). A replacement may
be furnished in kind. See Jefferson County v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564,
566 (6th Cir. 1945).
37. See generally State Comm'r of Transp. v. Township of S. Hackensack, 65 N.J. 377,
381, 322 A.2d 818, 822 (1974) ("The inadequacy and incongruity of [the market
value standard] as compensation for the taking of. . . public facilities. . . led to
the development of the [substitute facilities] doctrine . . . . "). According to the
Supreme Court:
[The doctrine's] genesis is in language written by Chief Justice Taft in
Brown v. United States. In Brown, three-quarters of the town of American Falls, Idaho, was to be inundated and destroyed by the waters of a
reservoir on the Snake River. In that extreme situation the Chief Justice
observed, 'a method of compensation by substitution would seem to be the
best means of making the parties whole.'
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted) (quoting Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83 (1923», rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
451 (1984).
38. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968); City of
Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Des
Moines County, 148 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 743 (1945);
Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453, 454 (1st Cir. 1927). No compensation is due when reasonable alternative facilities already exist or are provided by the
taker. United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1957).
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whole, as required by the just compensation clause,39 unless sufficient
damages are awarded to replace the condemned facility, enabling the
public condemnee to provide anew the disrupted services to the public. 40
A public condemnee is entitled to the cost of a substitute facility,
however, only if a replacement facility is necessary to enable the public
condemnee to continue providing services to the community.41 Early decisions limited the substitute facilities doctrine to cases in which the public condemnee was obligated by statute to replace the condemned
facility.42 Later decisions, recognizing that many services provided by a
governmental body legally are not compelled, required only that the replacement be "in fact" necessary.43 This factual obligation rule, which
depends upon a finding that the condemned facility is reasonably necessary for the public welfare, "looks to the pragmatic needs and possibilities, and not just to the technical legal minima."44 A public condemnee's
legal or factual obligation to replace a condemned facility avoids the risk
of a resulting windfall "if the substitute facilities were never acquired, or
if acquired, were later sold or converted to any other use."4S
39. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("[condemnee] must be made
whole but is not entitled to more").
40. See United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965); Washington v.
United States, 214 F.2d 33, 40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954). The
substitute facilities doctrine is applicable regardless of whether it produces an award
greater or less than the market value of the property; see United States v. Des
Moines County, 148 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 743 (1945).
41. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965); Note, Just Compensation
and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L.J. 1053, 1053 (1966). The determination of
necessity is a matter for the judicial trier of fact. United States v. Streets, Alleys, &
Public Ways, 531 F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Los Angeles
County, 163 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1947). The courts have reached varied results
applying the substitute facilities doctrine in cases in which there is no longer a public need for the condemned property. A majority of the courts have held that the
public condemnee sustains no loss from the taking because the obligation to replace
a condemned facility is premised on a determination of public need; therefore, the
public condemnee is entitled only to nominal compensation. See United States v.
Stoutsville, 531 F.2d 882, 885-86 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of New
York, 168 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1948). A minority of courts have held that a
public condemnee is entitled to the condemned facility's market value, although
there is no longer a public need. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563
F.2d 357,359 (8th Cir. 1977); California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th
Cir. 1968).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 763 (4th Cir. 1958) (condemnee must be compelled legally to provide substitute property); United States v.
Wheeler TP., 66 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1933) (town must be compelled legally to
maintain roads); United States v. Alderson, 53 F. Supp. 528, 530-31 (S.D. W. Va.
1944) (state must be compelled legally to provide road system).
43. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 357, 359 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977)
(substitute facility must be reasonably necessary); United States v. Certain Property,
403 F.2d 800, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (public condemnee entitled to substitute facility
if obligated to replace).
44. United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 960, 965 (2d Cir. 1965).
45. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1979).
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The courts have utilized the substitute facilities doctrine primarily
to compensate a public condemnee for the taking of streets, bridges,
sewers, and similar nonsalable, publicly owned special purpose properties
that have only nominal value independent of their present use. 46 The
courts, however, also have applied the doctrine to compensate for the
taking of other public facilities regardless of whether a market value
existed for the condemned properties. 47 In the leading case of United
States v. Certain Property (Borough of Manhattan) ,48 the United States
condemned a public bath and recreation center owned and operated by
the city of New York.49 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the federal government argued that the substitute
facilities doctrine is an exception to the market value standard to be
applied only when the market value of a condemned facility is unascertainable. 50 The Second Circuit dismissed this argument, stating that a
public condemnee obligated to replace a condemned facility is entitled to
be awarded the cost of replacing the condemned facility, whether that
cost is more or less than the condemned facility's actual market value. 51
According to the court, the substitute facilities doctrine is an alternative
method of compensation available to the public condemnee obligated to
replace a condemned facility. 52
Until the 1979 Supreme Court decision in United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land (Lutheran Synod),53 there was little doubt that the substitute facilities standard was the proper measure of compensation when a
publicly owned facility was condemned. In Lutheran Synod, the Court
examined whether compensation measured by the substitute facilities
standard is proper when the government condemns facilities owned by a
private nonprofit organization operating the facilities for a public purpose when the market value of the condemned facilities is ascertainable. 54
46. See, e.g., Caporal v. United States, 577 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1977) (alleyway); Town
of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952) (sewer system), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968) (public bath
and recreation center); United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965)
(playground); United States v. Certain Land in Red Bluff, 192 F. Supp. 725 (N.D.
Cal. 1961) (parking lot). But see United States v. South Dakota Game, Fish, &
Parks Dept., 329 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1964) (allowing market value only).
48. 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 801. The district court held that the substitute facilities doctrine was inapplicable because the city, although authorized by law, was not required legally to replace the condemned building; consequently, compensation was based on the
condemned building's market value. Id. at 801-02. The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that replacement need only be reasonably necessary for the public welfare,
and remanded "to determine whether the 'substitute facilities' doctrine should be
applied." Id. at 804.
50. Id. at 803.
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
54. Id. at 508-09. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church in
America owned and operated several summer camps on land condemned by the
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The Third Circuit had held that the substitute facilities doctrine was
available as a measure of compensation to a private, nonprofit owner of
facilities operated for a public purpose. 55 The Supreme Court rejected
this extension of the substitute facilities doctrine, holding that a private
owner's nonprofit status does not require a departure from the usual
market value standard. 56 In a footnote, the Court explicitly reserved the
issue of substitute facilities compensation as applied to public condemnees. 57 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice White expressed
"substantial doubt" as to the propriety of the doctrine. 58
Consistent with its holding in Lutheran Synod, the Supreme Court
in United States v. 50 Acres of Land (Duncanville) 59 held that the market
value standard, when ascertainable, achieves a fair result for the public
condemnee as well as the private owner.60 The Court dismissed the city's
argument for substitute facility compensation based on its statutory obli-

55.

56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

government. Campers included underprivileged and emotionally disturbed children
who received scholarships, as well as many campers who were not deprived financially and did not receive financial assistance. By virtue of grandfather clauses, the
camps were allowed to operate in noncompliance with state and federal housing and
environmental legislation, but replacement would require compliance with this legislation. The church's expert witnesses estimated replacement costs to be approximately $4,361,000, whereas the jury returned a verdict of $240,000 representing the
fair market value of the camps. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d
983, 985-86 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1974) (interlocutory appeal). The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the facts
of this case were appropriate for application of the substitute facilities doctrine. Id.
On remand, the jury found that the church was not entitled to compensation determined by the substitute facilities doctrine and awarded the church the market value
of the property. A different panel of the court of appeals reversed, finding the
court's jury instructions in error, and ordering a new trial. United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 996 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). The
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit panel. United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979). The case was the subject of two casenotes, both of
which argued that the substitute facilities doctrine was applicable. See Note, Cost of
Substitute Facilities as a Measure of Just Compensation When There is a Private
Condemnee, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1133 (1975); Note, Substitute Facility Measure of Just
Compensation Is Available to Private Owners of Nonprofit Community Facilities in
Appropriate Cases, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 711 (1975). Several state courts have
considered the same question, reaching conflicting results. Compare Newton Girl
Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 355 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d
769 (1956) (allowing application of substitute facilities doctrine where a Girl Scout
camp was condemned), with State v. First Methodist Church, 6 Or. App. 492, 488
P.2d 835 (1971) (disallowing application of substitute facilities doctrine where a
church youth center was condemned).
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979). The Court's
decision "was based, in part, on a fear that a private condemnee might receive a
windfall if 'substitute facilities were never acquired, or if acquired, were later sold or
converted to another use. '" United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 457
(1984) (quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979».
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 509 n.3 (1979).
Id. at 517-19 (White, J., concurring).
105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
Id. at 457.
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gation to provide for municipal garbage disposal as "no more compelling
than the [economic] obligations assumed by private citizens."61
In deciding this issue, the Court first addressed the differences between the public and the private condemnee. The Court found that the
loss to a public condemnee when a public facility is condemned "may be
no less acute" than the loss to the private owner when private property is
condemned. 62 Moreover, the Court stated that the just compensation
clause, which refers only to compensation for "private property," does
not require greater compensation for public condemnees than it requires
for private condemnees. 63 Accordingly, "the same principles of just
compensation presumptively apply to both private and public
condemnees. "64
The Court next addressed the risk of a windfall to the public condemnee under the substitute facilities doctrine. The Court stated that the
city's legal obligation to replace the condemned landfill would not avoid
the risk of a windfa1l65 because the city necessarily would experience a
windfall under the substitute facilities doctrine by receiving funds for a
more costly, presumably more valuable facility.66 Furthermore, the
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's finding that the risk of a windfall could
be reduced by discounting the award to account for the superior quality
of the new facility.67 The Court reasoned that discounting was simply a
more complex and speculative method of arriving at the market value of
a condemned facility.68
61. [d.
62. [d. at 456.
63. [d. at 455; see also supra note 2 (state and municipal property subject to the federal
power of eminent domain).
64. [d.
65. See supra text accompanying note 45.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 457. According to the Court, "any increase in the quality of the facility
may be as readily characterized as a 'windfall' as the award of cash proceeds for a
substitute facility that is never built." [d.
67. [d. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's instruction regarding the substitute facilities standard was "inadequate to enable the jury to make a fair and complete determination of the costs, including consideration of the benefits received, of
this particular substitute facility." United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d
1356, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984); see
also United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968) ("equitable
principles undergirding just compensation require that the substitution cost be discounted by reason of the benefit which accrues to the condemnee when a new building replaces one with expired useful years").
68. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 457-58 (1984). According to the
Court, under this approach, the jury would have to make at least two
determinations:
(i) the reasonable (rather than actual) replacement cost, which would require an inquiry into the fair market value of the second facility; and (ii)
the extent to which the new facility is superior to the old, which would
require an analysis of the qualitative differences between the new and the
old. It would also be necessary to determine the fair market value of the
old property in order to provide a basis for comparison.
[d.
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Finally, the Court addressed the need to measure just compensation
by objective standards that disregard the condemned property's subjective value to its owner.69 The Court stated that the "open-ended character of the substitute facilities doctrine" increases the possibility of a
windfall to the public condemnee because the "condemnation contest is
between the local community and a national government that may be
thought to have unlimited resources. "70
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that a public condemnee obligated to replace a condemned facility should not be limited
to compensation determined by the market value when the public condemnee can prove that the market value standard in a particular case
would be manifestly unjust.7 1 According to Justice O'Connor, the market value standard would be manifestly unjust when "the market value
. . . deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the
Just Compensation Clause. . . ."72
The substitute facilities doctrine requires compensation greater than
market value to enable the public condemnee to replace the condemned
facility.?3 Historically, however, deviation from the market value standard was necessary only in two circumstances, neither of which were
present in Duncanville: (1) when market value was unascertainable; or
(2) when the market value standard would result in "manifest injustice."74 The Court has stated repeatedly that private property's subjective value to its owner is not compensable; 75 accordingly, a public
facility's value in terms of its worth to the community should not be
considered when determining the just compensation owed a public condemnee. Because compensation is "for the property and not to the
owner,"76 the obligation of the public condemnee to replace the condemned facility does not necessitate a departure from the market value
standard when the market value is ascertainable.
Duncanville leaves a couple of questions unanswered. The majority
expressed no view concerning the availability of the substitute facilities
doctrine in circumstances where application of the market value standard would be "manifestly unjust." The concurring opinion stated that
the substitute facilities standard should be available to the public condemnee when the condemned facility's market value "deviates signifi69. Id. at 458; see supra text accompanying notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
70. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 458 (1984). The Court, however,
stated that "we express no view. . . on reproduction costs . . . when offered on the
issue of fair market value." Id. at n.24.
71. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 26.
72. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 459 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
73. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1979) (White, J.,
concurring); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 529 F. Supp. 220, 222-23 (N.D.
Tex. 1981), rev'd, 706 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
75. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing sUbjective value).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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candy from the make-whole remedy" intended by the fifth amendment, 77
but the opinion did not indicate when a deviation would be significant
enough to necessitate a departure from the market value standard. The
Court's preference for market value as an objective and workable measure of value,78 however, indicates that when market value is ascertainable this exception to the market value standard rarely will be applied.
The availability of the substitute facilities doctrine when the market
value of a condemned facility- is unascertainable also is unclear.
However, in light of the Court's rejection in Duncanville of the public
condemnee's obligation to replace a condemned facility as a relevant factor in the determination of just compensation,79 the viability of the substitute facilities doctrine, even when the market value is unascertainable,
is doubtful. According to Duncanville, the government should be required to compensate the public condemnee only for the value of the
property taken, not for the loss of services previously provided by the
condemned facility. The courts apply the cost approach to determine
compensation when privately owned, special purpose property is condemned. 80 Hence, the cost approach also should be applied when publicly owned, special purpose property is condemned. 8)
Despite these unanswered questions, the limitation of the substitute
facilities doctrine in Duncanville is a logical application of just compensation principles. The inequity of the failure to fully indemnify the public
condemnee for its loss, thereby forcing it to expend public funds to replace the condemned facility, must be viewed in light of the well-established treatment of private owners. Duncanville simply places the public
condemnee in the same position as the private owner in the context of the
just compensation clause of the fifth amendment.

Steven M Sind/er

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

text accompanying notes 71-72.
notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 60-61.
note 29 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 64.

